Queer Theories, Critiques and Beyond by Stormhøj, Christel
The term ‘queer’
means across, and is construed by queer
theory as referring to that which runs
transversely to the legitimate, or what is as-
sumed to be the order of things. By defini-
tion, queer delineates a critical positionality
vis-à-vis the normative.1 Queer thought,
then, is a critical enterprise. But what does
this mean, and what is critique? Critique is
generally defined as the art of passing
judgement on something (knowledge, cul-
ture, politics) with reference to some stan-
dard – of rightness or efficiency, for exam-
ple (Koselleck 1979; Sinnerbrink et al.
2006). These standards may be external or
internal to the object of critique; be stated
explicitly or remain implicit to the judge-
ments made; have strong or weak norma-
tive grounds; and be claimed as universally
valid or merely contextually applicable. As I
will show, queer theory endorses various
standards, most of which bracket issues of







Which philosophical traditions of 
critique does queer thought feed on,
and what problems inhere in them;
what are the objects and aims of 
critique offered by queer thinkers; 
and how do they imagine, if at all, 
the ordering of the social world beyond
the negative moment of critique?
My aim is to explore and discuss queer as
critique focusing on the theory side of
queer. I base my examination on a series of
parallel readings of leading queer thinkers,
including Judith Butler, Eve Sedgwick, and
Michael Warner.2 To my knowledge, no
academic literature in the Nordic countries
has examined this issue methodically using
an all-encompassing philosophical (theore-
tical and political) approach. Focusing on
social critique,3 which pertains to standards
of what is right and good, I sketch out the
philosophical traditions and strategies of
social critique that provide the context in
which queer as critique emerges (part I). In
addition, I consider some of the dilemmas
and unresolved problems of these modes of
critique. Part II explores how queer func-
tions as a critique of the social, interrogat-
ing dominant knowledges, social hierar-
chies, and established norms around sex,
gender and sexuality. In doing so I investi-
gate in more detail the objects and aims of
queer critiques, along with scrutinising
how queer thinkers contend with the pit-
falls that haunt their cherished modes of
critique. Part III examines the link between
the negative moment of critique – i.e. at-
tempts to shed stifling forms of thought,
power and practice – and the positive mo-
ment, with the latter pointing towards
queer political visions and their ethico-
political underpinnings.
PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS AND
STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL CRITIQUE
If we are to gain a more thorough insight
into queer as critique, it is imperative to
consider the strands of critical philosophy
informing queer theory. My argument is
that queer forms of critique are premised
on the Hegelian/Marxist tradition of dia-
lectic as immanent critique, and on the
Nietzschean/late Wittgensteinian practice
of what I will call critique as intervention.
Recognizing this historical legacy helps to
achieve a better understanding of the prin-
cipal modes of critique at work in queer
theory, as well as some of the strengths and
inherent flaws that queer inevitably in-
herits.4 Within the tradition of immanent
critique, lines of descent can be drawn from
Hegel-Marx-Derrida to two modes of
queer critique: deconstruction, and the
critique of ideology. In terms of critique as
intervention, we may identify two separate
lines of descent. One line links queer’s
practice of genealogical critique with
Nietzsche and Foucault. Another line can
be drawn from Nietzsche-the late
Wittgenstein-Rorty to queer’s practice of
innovative re-description as critique. These
two traditions – of immanent critique and
critique as intervention – frame the key
strategies of critique applied by queer
thought, often rather idiosyncratically and
based on only part of each tradition, in
accordance with its own guiding impulses.5
Immanent critique presupposes that it is
possible to criticise a particular symbolic
and/or social formation in the name of a
standard that this formation contains with-
in itself.6 This strategy aims to identify and
locate inconsistencies within the premises
necessary for the production of these for-
mations.7 The idea of dialectic resolution is
central to Hegel’s (1972; 1977) critique,
which is based on the understanding that
every thought is one, incomplete, stage in
the unfolding of the Absolute Idea. Engag-
ing with the oppositions found in existing
philosophies, he claims that, instead of con-
flicting with each other, the two terms of a
binary are interrelated: they depend on
each other. Moreover, both terms are actu-
ally congruent with one another once
brought together and lifted up on a higher
stage, a process described as ‘sublation’.
Difference (negativity), then, is incorporat-
ed into identity when the Absolute Idea is
realized.
Relating to Hegel’s notion of dialectic,
Marx (1967) develops his own mode of cri-
tique, focusing on the contradictions of
capitalism and the ideological forms of
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knowledge associated with this social for-
mation.8 (The young) Marx’s critique of
ideology reveals what is hidden: the
exploitation of workers, exposing the dis-
parity between ideology and reality and lo-
cating this contradiction as endemic to real-
ity itself. Praxis (class struggle) and critical
theory serve as tools for overcoming capi-
talism. His critique, then, is political, ally-
ing itself with the workers’ movement in
order to assist it towards self-emancipation
through the clarification of its interests
(Marx 1978). 
There is an built-in dilemma in these
modes of critique: they can only question
particular formations by appealing to par-
ticular standards; such criteria, however, are
likely to be understood as external to the
formation under scrutiny. The critic thus
tends to present her standards as universal,
i.e. to occlude their contingent nature
(Boer 2012: 96).9 Though appearing not
to supply her own standards, the critic is
actually implicated in producing them. The
implication of such moves is that the strict
division between internal and external
critique cannot be maintained.
Derridean (1976; 1988) deconstruction
is a third version of immanent critique,
aiming to expose, and then destabilize, the
various binary oppositions on which domi-
nant thought is based. This strategy con-
tends that our basic binaries are unstable;
they are always already troubled, i.e. cha-
racterized by undecidability. Ostensibly
oppositional terms are inextricably inter-
related, and their implied hierarchies
reversible. They are thus both arbitrary and
politically instituted.
Apparently, deconstruction is purely pa-
rasitic; yet, because it is linked negatively to
the formation that it seeks to undo, it is
haunted by a paradox. Like this structure,
it cannot but implicitly articulate and per-
form value commitments, if only extremely
thin ones. It retrieves difference – in the
notion of the critical force of negativity – as
a resource that may help to lessen the vio-
lence of closure implied in our dominant
ways of thinking. As such, deconstruction
may contain resources for an account of
normativity. 
Critique as intervention operates by
redescribing the object of investigation in
unusual terms, and from unfamiliar per-
spectives, in order to transform the ways we
think about it. Nietzschean (1993) and
Foucauldian (1984) genealogy, which is a
historical form of critique, questions what
appears in the present as stable or given by
showing how such notions originated in
power struggles, and hence are contingent.
Re-presenting the object in a parodying or
dramatic form, what is distinctive lies in the
critical effect: the provocation of a sense of
astonishment in the audience that may dis-
turb our certainties and elicit existential
self-reflection (Saar 2009). This strategy
also suggests that certain aspects of the pre-
sent are problematic and in need of change.
Instead of using explicit norms to make
judgements, genealogy presupposes a set of
values (individual rights and freedoms) that
we already take seriously; however, because
it aims at provoking discomfort, it also en-
courages us to question them. Finally, as a
critical act, genealogy is always re-active, a
counter-attack: “the art of not being
governed like that” (Foucault 2002: 193).
There are problems related to this mode
of critique that cannot be settled. An im-
portant one concerns the normative
grounds of the criteria used. While Foucault
makes judgements about current practices
of power by repeatedly pointing to the dan-
gers associated with them, he refrains from
clarifying the norms that ground these eva-
luative aspects of his critique. Therefore
critics, such as Bernstein (1995) and
Habermas (1987), have charged him with
‘cryptonormativism’. If Foucault were to
rebut this objection, they argue, his con-
ception of danger would require some in-
dependent warrant. However, there are
other ways to interpret his critical thinking
that make sense of it on its own premises,
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though they do not necessarily protect him
against criticism. Here, I will only be able
to suggest two readings: (i) His critical
enterprise is mainly negativistic, articulating
a dystopic diagnosis of modernity that
focuses on its inherent dangers, which he
associates with extensive normalization.10
We can only know the stifling forms of
power, thought, and practice that circum-
scribe our modes of being, but nothing be-
yond them, as, in his view, socialization
goes the whole way through. Knowledge of
these limits is sufficient to underpin his
critical thinking. (ii) As in Derridean de-
construction, Foucault displays the aporetic
situation of critique.11 Critique is, like the
practices of power that it targets, itself con-
tingently conditioned, and in interrogating
certain value commitments cannot but
posit values itself. This may explain why
genealogy at once presupposes and chal-
lenges the values we (and Foucault himself)
already hold. We have no other alternative
than these normative commitments due to
our social and historical embeddings; yet,
these commitments are nevertheless subject
to change.
In Rorty (1989), pragmatic critique is
framed as innovative re-description. As in
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein’s later work, he
claims that scientific vocabularies are tools
for coping: their truth claims are to be de-
cided as to the purposes they serve in prac-
tice. Pragmatic thought provides the best
resources for inventing new ways of think-
ing and acting that can be used to reduce
suffering and assist us in clarifying social
goals and the ways to achieve them. Any
value commitment (including, of course,
Rorty’s own liberalism) is a historical con-
tingency and as such without any universal
normative foundation. Liberals whose key
imperative is to combat violence promote
their cause through convincing redescrip-
tions and ‘humanizing’ narratives, in terms
that are comprehensible given community
based understandings. As in genealogical
critique, a problem with this strategy of cri-
tique arises from its normative basis, which
may suggest to some that Rorty advocates a
kind of relativism. We should rather ima-
gine his critical thinking as a normative
contextualism that rejects the possibility of
transcendental strategies of justification. We
only have access to context-dependent war-
rants because we cannot take up stand-
points that transcend our social and histori-
cal context.
QUEER CRITIQUES
Generally, queer thought interrogates nor-
mative notions of sex, gender, and sexuali-
ty. As a corollary it is critical of those forms
of identity, community, and politics which
are believed to grow naturally from such
ideas, whether deployed in the service of
the consolidation of the heterosexual
imperative, or by the mainstream of the gay
and lesbian community.
Though it is impossible to summarize
the multiple strands of critical thought that
queer theory (itself a heterogeneous body
of work) feeds on, I suggest that the best
way to conceive queer theory – along with
its antecedents, twentieth-century conti-
nental poststructuralism and analytical phi-
losophy, including Rorty’s pragmatism – is
as an anti- or critical philosophical position,
defined primarily by what it rejects.12 In
epistemology queer thought endorses anti-
foundationalism (there is no philosophical
grounding for our knowledge); in philoso-
phy of language anti-representationalism
(language is an activity that produces
meaning in a performative manner, as well
as a tool for coping rather than a represen-
tation mirroring reality); and in meta-
physics anti-essentialism (there is no real,
true essence of things – no invariable pro-
perties that define what any given thing
is).13 By implication, this means that queer
thinking is always marginal to the tradition
of western philosophy, operating through
lines of counter-thought. It is much more
an interrogative than a normative mode of
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inquiry, challenging established notions
and norms instead of offering solutions and
blueprints. How does ‘theoretical’ queer
thought conceive the practice of critique? 
Despite their different theoretical affilia-
tions, the three leading queer thinkers,
Sedgwick, Warner, and Butler, share certain
notions of critique: (i) Critique has trans-
formation as one of its main goals. (ii)
(Queer) theory is itself transformative.
Intervening in the politics of knowledge, it
interrogates that which is assumed to be
the order of things to expose the limita-
tions, contingencies and instabilities of our
dominant ontological and epistemological
certainties. Queer critique is suspicious of
efforts to be normative: any such attempts
may be products of prevailing power/
knowledge relations, such that our epistemo-
logical frames may sustain ways of structur-
ing the social world that preclude alterna-
tive possibilities of ordering. (iii) Theoreti-
cal and practical critique is more or less in-
tertwined. (iv) There is an ethical dimen-
sion to their projects, such that they are
committed to beginning their inquiries
from the margins. Queer inquiry responds
to the violence that norms do to people
who are engaged in non-conforming gen-
der and sexual practices. Hence, (v) cri-
tique is a life-and-death struggle.
In what follows I engage with the two
modes of critique (immanent critique and
critique as intervention) elaborated in part
I to look into both the objects and aims of
critique offered by these scholars, and to
explore how they wrestle with the dilem-
mas and unresolved problems carried over
from their predecessors.
Sedgwick deploys deconstruction, as is
particularly evident in Epistemology of the
Closet (1990) and Tendencies (1993).14
Whether targeting our social-sexual regime
as centred on the hetero/homo trope, or
Western culture’s epistemological frame as
organized by binaries (such as secrecy/dis-
closure and public/private) which are inter-
twined with the hetero/homo opposition,
she draws on immanent forms of critique.
She repeatedly reveals not just contradic-
tions and fractures where unity and consis-
tency are said to reign, but the interdepen-
dency of the terms of such oppositions.
Our sexual definitions rest on sinking
sands, moving unevenly between contradic-
tory poles. In the case of the hetero/homo
figure, the minoritizing strategy holds that
this definitional knot has importance for a
delimited minority group only, the group
named and classified as homosexuals by the
‘psy-sciences’. In contrast, the universaliz-
ing strategy claims that this knot is of de-
terminative importance to people across
the spectrum of sexuality. The very instabil-
ity of the hetero/homo sexual definition
makes it a privileged site for deconstruction
(ibid. 1990: 10). This is, however, only one
aspect of her critical aim, which is to dis-
locate the staying power of heterosexism.
The other side is to reveal how reductive it
is to define sexual orientation by the gen-
der of one’s object choice alone (ibid.
1990: 25). Making the hetero/homo fig-
ure into the core organizing principle of
the socio-sexual domain implies that other
possible dimensions of the sexual are ig-
nored. In contrast to the ensemble of ‘psy-
sciences’ and bio-political measures that
produces this compulsion to classify, evalu-
ate and regulate selves and populations ac-
cording to this opposition, Sedgwick sug-
gests – in line with deconstruction’s ‘prin-
ciple’ of différence – that people differ from
each other sexually and in other ways (ibid.
1993: 2).15 Aware that deconstruction is far
from sufficient to disable the workings of
this regime, she stresses the importance of
practical politics. As I read her, she points
towards a Marxist conception of critique as
politically engaged. The gay movements of
the 20th century have stated their case, she
claims, along two parallel lines: the minori-
ty and the universalist line. But the theore-
tical quandaries that deconstruction led us
to (in her perspective, the priority of the
universalizing view – the queer view – over
QUEER THEORIES, CRITIQUES AND BEYOND 65
the minoritizing view actually depends on
the latter to get off the ground) echo the
central dilemma found at the level of poli-
tics. This dilemma consists, on the one
hand, of the impulse to reject identifying
with established sexual categories, and, on
the other, of the feeling that these cate-
gories represent important resources indi-
vidually and politically (ibid. 1990: 13).
While I agree with Sedgwick that the mino-
rity-model merely targets ‘the symptoms’
of heteronormativity16 – the misrecognition
of non-heterosexual practices and relations
– and that the universalist-model goes to
the very heart of this system, it seems un-
clear what force she attributes to the latter.
What are the actual accomplishments of a
politics based on refutation to identify with
such categories – and as they are performed
by whom, where and when? If rebellion
against the fixity of identities is celebrated
for its own sake, it degenerates into an
empty gesture, and its transformative force
becomes null and nix. If a queer politics is
to be effective,17 it requires access to multi-
ple discursive resources and voices, the for-
mation of alliances with culturally elite
groups which can offer advocacy, and
broad mobilizations of civil society.
In the programmatic introduction to
Fear of a Queer Planet (1993), Warner en-
gages in immanent critique as elaborated
by (the young) Marx. Anchored in the ac-
tual experiences of queers in the present, 18
the task of queer theory is to clarify the
agonizing question: what do queers want?
(ibid. 1993: vii). Queer thought aims to
both analyse and criticise the ways in which
institutions, social practices and systems of
knowledge operate to privilege heterosexu-
ality and subordinate non-conforming
modes of sexual desire, practice and rela-
tions. In order to dislodge this privilege
Warner urges queer theorists to demystify
heterosexual ideology in its many forms,19
including the naturalisation of heterosexu-
ality, het culture’s ability to represent itself
as society, and the equation of the human
with the heterosexual. Such ideology legit-
imizes the prevailing heterosexual order by
masking the unequal valorisation of sexual
groups and dissimulating the real contra-
dictions between heterosexuals and non-
heterosexuals (ibid. 1993: xix). The task of
queer theory, then, is to re-describe the so-
cial world in another vocabulary – one that
unmasks these unequal relations of power.
The inconsistencies in how things really
are, and the distortion of reality engen-
dered by het ideology, provides the ground
for immanent (queer) critique. Though
lacking a satisfactory analysis of the causes
of heterosexism and of the social position
of non-heterosexuals, Warner (1993: xxv)
argues that in modern societies sexuality
defines a political interest-constituency that
is more like a status group than a class. As
an engaged form of critique, Warner’s cri-
tique is linked to the struggles and con-
cerns of the queer political movements that
oppose normalization. By his account,
queer theory helps to conceptualize and
promote their political claims and interests.
Such interests may be concerned with what
the best practice of combating queer bash-
ing would be, or they may stem from
visions of a queer life without suffering and
alienations.
Remarkably, Warner appears to ignore
the profound criticisms leveled at ideology
critique as practiced by Marxist thought,
though he raises objections to other basic
Marxist premises (ibid. 1993: xxiii). Here, I
shall concentrate on two such criticisms.
First, the conception of ideology as a total-
ising set of notions that determine people’s
ways of thinking and acting has been reject-
ed. Heterosexual ideology is not mono-
lithic, does not operate in the same way in
every context, and guides rather than de-
termines consciousness. Second, ideology
critique is based on untenable presupposi-
tions at the level of philosophy of science –
assumptions that the social sciences and
humanities today have, if not abandoned,
then at least interrogated and modified. It
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assumes that: (i) people suffer from false
consciousness and are unable to see ‘real’
reality; and (ii) that there is a truth behind
ideology, which Marxist thought has privi-
leged access to unmask. In my view,
Warner’s critique is weakened because he
fails to leave behind the untenable distinc-
tion between ‘ideology’ and a form of
thought (namely the Marxists’ own) which
escapes ‘ideology’. Ironically, this failure
implies that any kind of critical thinking (in
this case, Warners’ own) that does not take
into account its own performative aspects
becomes ideological. Ideology backfires as
a boomerang. One way to solve this prob-
lem would be to substitute the concept of
ideology with others such as discourse, in-
terpretive schemes, etc., and to reconcep-
tualise epistemological conflicts as struggles
for discursive authority. Warner’s framing
of queer critique is also inconsistent in that
his syncreticism of Marxist and poststruc-
turalist theoretical premises seems indefens-
ible. Rather than reconstructing key no-
tions of one tradition on the premises of
the other, he lumps them together.
Warner is aware of the divisions amongst
self-identified gay/lesbian and queer ac-
tivists (1993: xvii; 1999: 25f.), and deploys
pragmatic critique to sort through the con-
sequences of pursuing different types of
politics based on correspondingly different
vocabularies. Traditional gay and lesbian
politics – centred on a notion of respecta-
bility and focused on gaining recognition –
may end up reinforcing the normalization
of gays and lesbians. Queer politics, in con-
trast, takes up an anti-normative position-
ing vis-à-vis sexuality, gender and other
regimes of power and discipline. Though
such a politics is more difficult to pursue,
due to the political context for framing
claims – a context that recognizes the lan-
guage of identity politics only – it is never-
theless urgent, he argues, if we are to resist
normalization. Warner points out that
identity politics may run counter to shelter-
ing sexual diversity, and, when viewed from
the high grounds of theory, this critique is
warranted. When framed as a pragmatic cri-
tique, however, it is misplaced. Stated too
categorically, it misses the messiness and
complexity of politics, and risks overlook-
ing the potential of reformist politics.
Butler engages in immanent and inter-
vening critique. Using dialectic reasoning
as a tool of immanent critique (though a
post-Hegelian dialectic, which rejects the
possibility of reaching a final resolution),
she (1995: 129; 2000: 161) destabilises
different universals (humanness, human
rights etc.),20 claiming the impossibility of
finally identifying any universal with any
particular content. Analysing Vatican dis-
course on the human, she exposes a dispari-
ty between the ideals praised by this church
– the sanctity of human life – and its actual
treatment of what it itself labels as homo-
sexuals’ humanness. Insisting that the
human is identical with the heterosexual,
homosexuals are seen as less than human.
By producing such a differential, the Vati-
can betrays its own claim on universality.
Obviously, her project is to render the cate-
gory of the human permanently open and
contestable; but the force she claims for
(this) immanent critique is unclear given
the tremendous power held by the Vatican
in human rights settings. And she is hardly
impartial as to the standard of critique. Her
own normative commitments (for instance
to equality and precariousness) require a
robust universalizing of rights, and she
therefore includes the abjected in the cate-
gory of the human to get her critique off
the ground.21 At the level of theory,
Butler’s critique could be reinforced. One
could point out that the hierarchy estab-
lished by the Vatican between the universal
and the particular, in which heterosexuality
is associated with the former and homosex-
uality with the latter, is actually based on a
decision that ‘cancels’ the undecidable play
between the two terms. In principle, the
priority of the universal over the particular
could be reversed. In support of such a de-
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vice, one might argue that homosexuality is
the condition of the possibility of hetero-
sexuality, or simply that the latter is a sup-
plement to it.22 Another way to add to the
force of Butler’s critic would consist of
showing how the Vatican’s discourse tends
to conceive of its own particular criteria
(derived from a sexual morality in which
the heterosexual order is imposed by God)
as a universal standard, and hence to dis-
simulate the contingent nature of these cri-
teria. In short, such a critique would ex-
pose the false universality through which
the Vatican attempts to hegemonize the
human.
To destabilize the foundationalist no-
tions of gender identity – those theories
that assume that gender identity is a natural
‘thing’ – Butler engages in a genealogical
critique of gender ontologies so as to “in-
vestigate[s] the political stakes in designat-
ing as an origin and cause those identity
categories that are in fact the effects of in-
stitutions, practices, discourses” (1990: ix).
One of the crucial regimes of power for
maintaining such notions is the institution
of compulsory heterosexuality, which rep-
resents males and females as ‘the real’ sexes
rooted in an original heterosexuality and
finds expression in oppositional feminine
and masculine dispositions.23 As such, the
power at work in the heterosexualisation of
subjects is effectively masked. The task of
her critique is to expose that power, which
dissimulates as ontology, and to re-describe
gender identity in a radically new way: as a
process,24 a material constitution of the
subject that takes place through a forcible
reiteration of gender norms (Butler
1993).25 For her, all gender is a repetition,
the ‘ground’ of which is a vanishing point
(ibid. 1990: 136). Crucially, the becoming
of a woman or a man (though this process
enables precisely these identities) also does
violence to all those genders which fail to
comply with hegemonic heterosexual
norms. The intended shock-effect of But-
ler’s re-description concerns three issues:
The recognition of the genuinely political
nature of gender; the violence that prevail-
ing norms do to us; and the possibility of
reworking those norms given the proper
ontological groundlessness of sex. While
Butler’s use of genealogical critique appears
productive in precisely this respect, it is,
however, reductive as well. By focusing on
philosophical texts alone she fails to ac-
count for the socio-cultural and historical
conditions which both enable and limit the
workings of heteronormativity, the very
phenomenon that she is critically analysing.
In Undoing Gender (2004), Butler ad-
dresses the question of survival as it relates
to the struggles of the new movement con-
cerned with intersex. Considering the con-
flict between queer theory’s tendency to re-
ject identity categories (which are seen as
having exclusionary and normalizing ef-
fects) and the intersex movement’s insis-
tence on the necessity of stable sex assign-
ment, in order to protect the survival of in-
tersex children, Butler practices pragmatic
critique. In principle, a queer politics op-
posing normalization is preferable; still, in
practice, intersex minors may need firm
identities to function well (ibid. 2004: 8).
Concurrently, she appreciates the intersex
movement’s criticism of coercive surgery
that adjusts intersexed bodies to bipolar
gender norms. Such balanced considera-
tions seem reasonable. Deciding on the
usefulness of identity categories becomes
pragmatic, linked with a concern to reduce
suffering.
BEYOND THE NEGATIVE MOMENT
OF CRITIQUE
Does queer critique merely confront us
with the misery and violence that our cur-
rent social-sexual regime cannot but pro-
duce, without providing us with visions of
more desirable futures based on alternative
norms? If we were to believe critics who
charge queer thought with political ni-
hilism and quietism (e.g. Nussbaum [1999]
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and Seidman [1995]), this would be the
case. True, queer is mainly an interrogative
mode of inquiry, problematizing estab-
lished notions and norms, and raising new
sorts of questions about the historical con-
tingencies that are always shaping us, limit-
ing what we are. Despite the flaws I find in
queer, this critical sting makes it extremely
productive. Moreover, queer is not devoid
of value commitments. If understood cor-
rectly, it contains unnoticed resources for
normative accounts. Due to the aporetic
situation of critique mentioned above,
queer cannot but set norms itself when
practicing critique. We might therefore ask
how queer thinkers imagine the ordering of
the social world, and to which norms they
are committed. Here, I can only provide
some tentative insights.
In praising existential singularity and dif-
ference, Sedgwick (1993: xiii) alludes to a
wished-for order of social difference, the
gain of which would be the protection of
diversity. This vision, however, raises thorny
ethical and political questions, including
questions of ethical codes that can provide
guidance as to which differences to pre-
serve, and of the political principles needed
to secure legitimate normative regulation.
On these issues, Sedgwick has little to say.
Warner (1999: 1ff) invokes a principle of
sexual autonomy that enables people to
manage the choices involved in their sexual
lives themselves, without interference from
the state, unless they violate the autonomy
of others. A sexual ethics building on this
principle is already present in queer politi-
cal culture, allowing for sexual variance.
The advantage of such an ethics, based on
‘thin’ value commitments (autonomy, con-
sent, responsibility), lies in its ability to
shelter the integrity of many sexual differ-
ences; still, there is a need to provide some
warrants for these values. Why is self-
determination a good? Because we consent
to it as a mere product of our accultura-
tion, as Rorty would argue? Warner is silent
on this matter. Butler (2002; 2004) argues
for a politics of disobedient interrogation
and of radical resignification of the hege-
monic norms that circumscribe the domain
of socially recognized bodies and relations.
Behind these practices lies a normative
commitment to broaden the category of
the human and to end the violence of ex-
clusion, unreality or annihilation. Her
wished-for social order would allow the co-
existence of different modes of living and
arrange for their institutional support. Ethi-
cally, she advocates a responsibility to dif-
ference. At an institutional level, and relat-
ed to the question of social justice, she
speaks of a set of human capacities that are
to be provided so as to enable us to func-
tion well; and with regard to government,
she advocates a radical democratic frame
for organizing public contestation of just
norms. As I read her, she invokes a forma-
listic, minimalistically normative principle as
justification, saying that human flourishing
is a good. This ideal is deliberately vague
and its meaning radically underdetermined:
it simply tells us that we should create the
conditions that enable collective and indi-
vidual subjects to come into full existence
and live a liveable life. If Butler is to im-
prove her political theory it requires a clari-
fication of the distinction between enabling
and disabling norms, given the difficulties
in separating normativity from normaliza-
tion, and of the impossibility of universal
inclusion given the need to minimize vio-
lence.
NOTER
1. In queer thinking, the normative (and the de-
rivative term, normativity) is a type of operation of
power that establishes and promotes a set of norms
of being and behaviour. Norms are operative at the
level of subject-formation, as the subject comes in-
to existence when assuming or embodying the
norms of gender, sex etc. While I consider the
‘normal’ to be a statistical category, norms are 
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morally established and have the force of impera-
tives, prescriptions and prohibitions.
2. Obviously, it is contestable, who the ‘queens’ of
queer theory are. I have selected these three be-
cause of their crucial, though quite diverse, impact
on the constitution of the field of queer theory,
which from its very beginning has been US-based.
One evidence of their influence is that newcomers
in the field continue to quote and discuss their
works.
3. The object of social critique is society (as a
whole, or parts thereof, such as social conditions,
institutions, forms of thought, practices etc.), and
its normative structures.
4. Such acknowledgement may also serve as a
healthy antidote to claims about the newness or
originality of queer as a critical philosophical para-
digm, staged as if it emerges ex nihilo. While I do
see queer theory as an innovative approach,
nonetheless, it is necessary to adopt a historical
perspective, reminding us that queer modes of cri-
tique has a substantial history in philosophy. Apart
from this distinct legacy that also includes post-
structuralism, queer theory’s insights derive from a
number of sources, including feminist theory, les-
bian and gay studies, and social science disciplines.
For further discussion of the latter, see for example
Seidman (1996), Walters (1996), and Schott
(2003).
5. As each strategy is characterized by a particular
way of approaching the question about what is
right and good, they are to be interpreted as
modes of critique sui generis, implying that they
are not mutually exclusive. The individual queer
critic may deploy several of these simultaneously
without running into contradictions.
6. Providing an exhaustive account of these strate-
gies is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, I
sketch their key premises and their associated form
of critique.
7. In modern philosophy, Kant, of course, was the
first to elaborate a schedule for immanent critique.
Yet, he has no direct bearing on queer’s concep-
tion of critical thought.
8. Marx alters the Hegelian frame radically, sub-
stituting materialism for idealism and replacing
reason as such/spirit with real man, class struggle,
and the tension between the forces and relations of
production.
9. Both Hegel and Marx posit particular standards
as universal, the former reason and the latter hu-
manity and the overcoming of self-alienation. For
a further elaboration, see Boer (2012).
10. Normalization is a type of operation of power
that assesses modes of being and behaviour ac-
cording to established norms. It is an association
of bodily typologies with authorised knowledges
and norms that operate to discipline, dispose and
orient subjects.
11. The term ‘aporetic’ (deriving from aporia)
means a problem, a difficulty, a quandary with no
solution. 
12. In my view, as indicated in the first section of
this article, Rorty’s position vis-à-vis traditional
philosophy is quite similar to that of French post-
structuralists. Both positions are developed in the
wake of the linguistic turn. 
13. For a more detailed elaboration, see Stormhøj
(2006, in particular, chapter 2).
14. It should be noted, however, that Sedgwick, in
her late phase, leaves deconstruction behind. In
Touching Feeling (2003), she suggests a reparative
reading program looking for the openings and
moments of comfort that any text may offer. This
schedule may secure the survival of queers better
than a deconstructive critique. 
15. Différence refers to the differing and deferring
aspects involved in meaning making that ensures
that meaning can never be definitively present.
16. Heteronormativity refers to the complex set of
modes of understanding, knowledges both theo-
retical and practical, which make heterosexuality
privileged and into a compulsory requirement.
17. Queer as a political mode of self-identification
is notoriously difficult to define. Yet, I take it to
refer to an identification with a political con-
stituency mobilising around the term queer in
order to contest the social dominance of hetero-
sexuality.
18. See note 17.
19. (Heterosexual) ideology in the Marxist tradi-
tion refers to dominant forms of knowledge and
belief that (i) in principle, covers everything from
scientific knowledge, to religion, to everyday be-
liefs about proper conduct; (ii) distorts reality, and
(iii) serves to legitimize status quo, in this case
heterosexual dominance.
20. In Butler, the meaning of humanness is under-
determined. As a contested category, its meaning
is set in competitions for discursive authority.
21. Here, the abjected refers to those humans,
which the Vatican calls homosexuals.
22. For Derrida, a supplement is something that,
allegedly secondarily, comes to serve as an aid to
something ‘original’ or ‘natural’. That which is
supplementary is always both an accretion and a
substitution. We may think of, for example, mas-
turbation as supplementary: it is never possible to
desire the presence ‘in person’ before the play of
substitution and the symbolic experience of auto-
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erotic. Therefore, in a sense, masturbation is ‘orig-
inary’.
23. The term ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ was
originally coined by Rich in the article, Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence (1980), in
which she examines and criticizes heterosexuality
as a political institution, as a normative require-
ment, maintained and legitimized by a series of
common sense and theoretical forms of knowl-
edge.
24. The notion of gender as a doing has itself a
complex genealogy in feminist theory and social
science disciplines, associated with the traditions of
French existentialism, Marxist and psychoanalytical
feminism, feminist anthropology, as well as sym-
bolic interactionism and ethnometodology. 
Butler’s contribution consists in reformulating this
idea within a unique syncretic approach that in-
cludes her theory of gender performativity.
25. If successful, the heterosexualization of sub-
jects produces intelligible genders, i.e. those gen-
ders, which institute and maintain relations of co-
herence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual
practice, and desire.
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SUMMARY
The article examines queer as critique by per-
forming a series of parallel readings of lead-
ing queer thinkers, including Judith Butler,
Eve Sedgwick, and Michael Warner. Intro-
ducing two philosophical traditions and
strategies of social critique, immanent and
intervening critique, along with their crite-
ria of what is right and good, I discuss how
these scholars engage in these strategies and
wrestle with their in-built problems within
the orbit of the research foci and ambitions of
queer studies. Queer critique aims at chal-
lenging dominant knowledges, social hierar-
chies and norms related to sex, sexuality, and
gender by exposing the limits they impose on
us, including the sufferings associated with
them. The article closes with considering
queer political visions and their normative
underpinnings.
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